

Message Text

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FM AMEMBASSY BRASILIA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3848

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 6 BRASILIA 1202

LIMDIS

E. O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: OVIP (KISSINGER, HENRY A.)

SUBJECT: PROPOSED INFORMAL AGENDA FOR SECRETARY'S VISIT

REFS: (A) BRASILIA 0111, (B) BRASILIA 1186

1. SUMMARY. THIS TELEGRAM SETS OUT MATTERS WHICH ARE LIKELY TO BE DISCUSSED BY SECRETARY DURING HIS VISIT, EITHER AT HIS OWN INITIATIVE OR AT INITIATIVE OF BRAZILIAN SIDE. TELEGRAM IS BROKEN DOWN INTO GLOBAL, HEMISPHERIC AND BILATERAL QUESTIONS ALTHOUGH IT IS UNDERSTOOD THAT CONVERSATIONS WILL NOT BE STRICTLY COMPARTMENTED IN THIS MANNER. THERE ARE SOME QUESTIONS LISTED AT END OF TELEGRAM THAT ARE DEPENDENT ON WASHINGTON DECISIONS. THE NEXT FOLLOWING TELEGRAM (EXDIS) SETS FORTH A RECAPITULATION OF SUBJECTS THAT MIGHT BE DISCUSSED, BY APPOINTMENT AND EVENT, A LISTING OF EVENTS AFFORDING OPPORTUNITY FOR PUBLIC EXPRESSION OF US VIEWS AND POLICIES, AND SOME SUGGESTIONS CONCERNING THE THREE COURTESY CALLS. END SUMMARY.

I. INFORMAL AGENDA

2. THE EMBASSY'S IDEAS CONCERNING THE OBJECTIVES TO BE ACHIEVED OR PURSUED IN THE SECRETARY'S VISIT ARE SET OUT IN REF A. THEY REMAIN VALID. THE EMBASSY'S EVE-OF-VISIT ASSESSMENT OF THE DOMESTIC

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ENVIRONMENT IN BRAZIL, OF BRAZIL'S INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

IN GENERAL, AND OF US-BRAZILIAN RELATIONS IN PARTICULAR
IS IN REF B.

3. IN THE FOLLOWING LISTING OF MATTERS TO BE DISCUSSED BY
THE SECRETARY, AT EITHER HIS INITIATIVE OR THAT OF HIS
BRAZILIAN INTERLOCUTORS, THE EMBASSY DOES NOT INTEND TO
SUGGEST THAT EITHER SIDE WILL HAVE ANY KIND OF FORMAL AGENDA
OR THAT THE SUBJECTS IDENTIFIED BELOW AS "GLOBAL", "HEMIS-
PHERIC" OR "BILATERAL" CAN BE OR WILL BE SO COMPARTMENTED.
WE ARE NOT TALKING ABOUT A HARD AGENDA BUT A RATHER FREE-
FLOWING EXAMINATION OF AREAS OF MUTUAL INTEREST. THE
MATTERS FOR DISCUSSION THAT ARE OUTLINED BELOW ARE DERIVED
FROM THE EMBASSY'S INTERPRETATION OF USG AND GOB CONCERNS.
WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S. ITEMS, WE HAVE INCLUDED SOME THAT
MAY OR MAY NOT BE RIPE OR APPROPRIATE FOR PRESENTATION BY
THE SECRETARY (E.G., THE NUCLEAR QUESTION, THE DEEP SEABEDS
QUESTION). ON THESE WE WILL NEED CLEAR WASHINGTON DECISIONS
BEFORE THE VISIT OCCURS, BECAUSE THE EMBASSY WILL NOT HAVE
MENTIONED THEM TO THE BRAZILIAN SIDE AND IT IS UNDERSTOOD
BETWEEN US THAT THE MEETINGS SHOULD CONTAIN NO SURPRISES
FOR EITHER SIDE.

4. "GLOBAL" QUESTIONS:

A. THE SECRETARY'S OVERVIEW:

ALL BRAZILIAN PARTICIPANTS, ESPECIALLY THE PRESIDENT,
GOLBERY AND SILVEIRA, WILL BE MOST INTERESTED IN THE
SECRETARY'S EVALUATION OF THE WORLD SCENE AND THE STRATEGIC
BALANCE. THE BRAZILIAN LEADERS ARE CONCERNED ABOUT THE STATE
OF U.S. MORALE AND OUR POLITICAL WILL TO EXERCISE OUR RESPON-
SIBILITIES AS LEADER OF THE WEST; SKEPTICAL OR CYNICAL
ABOUT DETENTE; AND WARY OF BEING EXPECTED OR ASKED TO UNDER-
TAKE PRACTICAL COMMITMENTS OF POLITICAL SUPPORT FOR OUR
POSITIONS. THE SECRETARY'S MOST SENIOR INTERLOCUTORS WILL
BE PARTICULARLY ATTENTIVE TO HIS JUDGMENTS ABOUT THE COURSE
OF DETENTE, THE PROSPECTS FOR SALT II, THE POSITION OF CHINA,
THE OUTLOOK IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND THE EFFECTS ON NATO OF
COMMUNIST ADVANCES IN WESTERN EUROPE (WITH THE BRAZILIANS
PROBABLY MOST RESPONSIVE ON PORTUGAL). THEY CERTAINLY EXPECT
THAT ANGOLA WILL BE ADDRESSED BY THE SECRETARY IN TERMS OF
ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR DETENTE AND FOR FUTURE U.S. MOVES IN
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BLACK AFRICA. THEY WILL ALSO BE ALERT FOR ANY ALLUSIONS
TO THE DEFENSE OF THE SOUTH ATLANTIC, BUT THEIR "SPECIAL"
RELATIONSHIP WITH THE MPLA GOVERNMENT WILL MAKE THEM
SENSITIVE TO ANY IMPLIED CRITICISM OF BRAZILIAN POLICY TOWARD
LUANDA. THE SECRETARY MAY WISH TO EXPRESS CONCERN OVER
TRENDS AT THE UN ("MECHANICAL MAJORITIES") AND OUR NEW
TOUGHER LINE IN RESPONSE TO THEM.

B. THE BRAZILIAN OVERVIEW:

THE EMBASSY CONSIDERS IT IMPORTANT THAT THE SECRETARY, IN HIS MEETINGS WITH GEISEL, GOLBERY AND SILVEIRA, (AND ALSO WITH SIMONSEN, REIS VELLOSO AND UEKI FOR THE ECONOMIC INPUT) ELICIT A CLEAR STATEMENT OF THE BRAZILIAN "VISION OF THE WORLD", OF BRAZIL'S CURRENT PLACE IN IT, AND OF THE EVOLVING BRAZILIAN ROLE AS IT MOVES TOWARD STATUS AS A MIDDLE AND EVENTUALLY A GREAT POWER. THE ANSWERS WILL BE FUZZY, GENERALIZED, AND EVEN UNCERTAIN, BUT THE PUTTING OF THE QUESTION IS LEGITIMATE, EVEN FLATTERING, AND MAY BE INSTRUCTIVE FOR US.

C. THE NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONSHIP:

--WE WOULD EXPECT THE SECRETARY TO OUTLINE FOR THE PRESIDENT, GOLBERY, SILVEIRA AND THE ECONOMIC MINISTERS THE U.S. STRATEGY FOR DEALING WITH NORTH-SOUTH ISSUES AS GIVEN PROGRAMMATIC DEFINITION IN THE SEVENTH SPECIAL SESSION. THE SECRETARY WILL PROBABLY FIND THAT HIS INTERLOCUTORS CONSIDER HIS SEPTEMBER 1, 1975 SPEECH TO HAVE BEEN A POLITICAL COUP BUT AN ECONOMIC DISAPPOINTMENT, PARTICULARLY TO "INTERMEDIATE" COUNTRIES LIKE BRAZIL. THE SECRETARY SHOULD ACKNOWLEDGE THE SPECIAL SITUATION OF THESE COUNTRIES AND REFER TO US 7TH SS PROPOSALS THAT APPLY TO THEM, ADDING THAT CLEARLY ADDITIONAL EFFORTS MUST BE MADE TO ADDRESS THEIR PROBLEMS.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3849

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 6 BRASILIA 1202

LIMDIS

--THE SECRETARY WILL, PRESUMABLY, EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACHE TO CIEC AS A COOPERATIVE, NON-CONFRONTATIONAL ADDRESS TO THE KEY NORTH-SOUTH CONFLICTS. THE

BRAZILIAN SIDE (GEISEL, SILVEIRA, SIMONSEN, REIS VELLOSO AND UEKI) WILL PROFESS THE GOB'S DESIRE TO BE A MODERATING FORCE WITHIN THE NINETEEN BUT WILL ALSO STRESS THE LIMITS ON THEIR ABILITY TO TAKE ON ADVANCED POSITIONS AND THE NEED FOR FURTHER AND SUBSTANTIAL DC MOVEMENT TO SATISFY THE NINETEEN'S DEMANDS.

--WITH RESPECT TO THE MTN'S, THE SECRETARY'S EXPECTED REFERENCES TO THE BASIC CONVERGENCE OF US-BRAZILIAN INTERESTS AND THE DESIRABILITY OF CLOSE US-BRAZILIAN CONSULTATION WILL BE MET BY AN AGREEMENT CONCERNING CONSULTATIONS, COUPLED WITH STRONG COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE SLOW PACE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE GENERAL LACK OF ANYTHING BUT PRO FORMA ATTENTION TO LDC NEEDS, AND THE SPECIFIC INADEQUACY OF US AND DC RESPONSES TO BRAZILIAN INSISTENCE ON SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT FOR LDC'S.

--FOOD: ON THE QUESTION OF WORLD FOOD PROGRAMS, WHICH THE BRAZILIAN SIDE WILL NOT RAISE BUT WILL PROBABLY EXPECT THE SECRETARY TO DISCUSS, MINISTER OF AGRICULTURE PAULINELLI WILL BE LIEKELY TO TAKE THE POSITION THAT BRAZIL IS CONTRIBUTING TO THE WORLD FOOD EFFORT BY ITS OWN PROGRAMS FOR INCREASING AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT AND PRODUCTIVITY. PAULINELLI WILL BE CAUTIOUS ABOUT FOOD RESERVES, FEARING THE PRICE-DEPRESSING EFFECTS OF ANY PROPOSALS THAT DO NOT

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CONTAIN STRONG NATIONAL CONTROLS AND SAFEGUARDS. (PAULINELLI HAS HAD SEVERAL MEETINGS WITH SECRETARY BUTZ. IT WOULD BE GOOD FOR THE SECRETARY TO MENTION TO HIM AT THEIR FIRST ENCOUNTER THAT BUTZ HAS SPOKEN HIGHLY OF HIM. THIS IS PARTICULARLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE PAULINELLI WAS SOMEWHAT MIFFED BY THE UNEXPECTED BREVITY OF HIS LAST MEETING WITH BUTZ.)

--STILL IN THE NORTH-SOUTH CONTEXT, THE SECRETARY MAY WISH TO RAISE (WITH SILVEIRA) THE IMPASSE ON DEEP SEABEDS IN THE LOS NEGOTIATIONS, EXPRESSING CONCERN THAT A CONTINUATION OF THE STALEMATE, IN WHICH BAZIL HAS HAD A KEY ROLE, MAY PREVENT THE CONCLUSION OF A TREATY AND INQUIRING ABOUT BRAZILIAN THINKING IN PREPARATION FOR THE MARCH MEETINGS IN NEW YORK. WE DOUBT VERY MUCH THAT THE BRAZILIAN POSITION HAS EVOLVED IN A POSITIVE DIRECTION, BUT AN INDICATION OF THE SECRETARY'S CLOSE ATTENTION TO THE PROBLEM COULD HAVE EVENTUAL UTILITY. IF THERE SHOULD BE SOME CONCRETE INITIATIVE FOR THE SECRETARY TO TAKE, SO MUCH THE BETTER FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. IF THERE IS WASHINGTON INTEREST IN HAVING THE MATTER RAISED, THE EMBASSY SHOULD BE INFORMED SO THAT WE CAN ADVISE SILVEIRA IN ADVANCE.

D. VIEW OF OTHER RECENT VISITORS:

THE SECRETARY MAY HAVE SOME INTEREST IN GETTING,

DURING SIDE CONVERSATIONS, SILVEIRA'S ACCOUNT OF THE RESULTS OF THE RECENT VISITS OF GENSCHER (NOVEMBER) AND SAUVAGNARGUES (JANUARY) AND THEIR VIEWS ON MATTERS OF COMMON US-BRAZILIAN INTEREST. (ACCORDING TO GERMAN AND FRENCH COLLEAGUES, SILVEIRA HAS NOT BEEN RETICENT ABOUT DISCUSSING WITH THE GERMAN AND FRENCH FOREIGN MINISTERS THE SECRETARY'S VIEW AS INTERPRETED BY SILVEIRA.) THERE WOULD BE SOME VALUE IN GETTING SILVEIRA'S PERSPECTIVES ON THE EARLIER VISITS.

5. HEMISPHERIC QUESTIONS

A. CUBAN INTERVENTION IN ANGOLA:

WE ASSUME THAT THE SECRETARY WILL ADVANCE THE POSITION DEFINED IN HIS RECENT PUBLIC APPEARANCES IN HIS MEETINGS WITH GEIEL, GOLBERY AND SILVEIRA. THE BRAZILIAN VIEW HAS BEEN QUITE WELL DEFINED IN EMBASSY REPORTING
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(BRASILIA 0980, 1097, 11186 PARA 30). THE AMBASSADOR IS SEEING SILVEIRA ON FEBRUARY 10, AND HE WILL REPORT IF THERE ARE ANY SIGNIFICANT CHANGES. IT IS WORTH REPEATING THAT THE GOB'S SENSITIVITIES ABOUT ITS ANGOLA POLICY AND THE DOMESTIC CRITICISM IS HAS RECEIVED WILL MAKE THE KEY INTERLOCUTORS SKITTISH OF AN OVERLAP BETWEEN THE QUESTION OF CUBAN INTERVENTION AND THE GENERAL ANGOLAN QUESTION.

B. OAS REFORM

BY THE TIME THE SECRETARY ARRIVES, SILVEIRA WILL HAVE HAD TIME TO ABSORB THE MOST RECENT US PROPOSALS FOR STRUCTURAL REFORMS, AND HE -- WHO WILL BE THE ONLY BRAZILIAN INTERESTED -- WILL ALMOST CERTAINLY HAVE SOME PRELIMINARY COMMENTS. WE ESTIMATE THAT HE WILL CONSIDER THE ELIMINATION OF THE PERMANENT COUNCIL TO BE TOO RADICAL A STEP AT THIS TIME BUT THAT HE WILL BE INTERESTED IN EXCHANGING OPINIONS WITH BLANCO, LIEVANO AND, LESS ENTHUSIASTICALLY, FACIO. WE HAVE LARGE DOUBTS THAT SILVEIRA WILL BE WILLING TO HAVE BRAZIL TAKE A LEAD IN PURSHING OUR PROPOSALS OR ADVANCING ANY OF ITS OWN. LIKE EVERYONE ELSE, SILVEIRA WILL PROBABLY BETRAY UNCERTAINTY ABOUT WHAT WE ALL ARE REFORMING AND STREAMLINING THE OAS TO DO. HE WILL ALSO REPEAT HIS CAUTION AGAINST BLAMING THE ORGANIZATION FOR THE DIFFERENCES THAT ARE VENTILATED IN IT. IN ANY EVENT, SILVEIRA'S GENERAL APPROACH WILL REFLECT THE FACT THAT BRAZIL DOES NOT CONSIDER THE OAS AN IMPORTANT INSTRUMENT OF ITS FOREIGN POLICY.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3850

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 6 BRASILIA 1202

LIMDIS

C. PANAMA:

ALTHOUGH THE CANAL QUESTION DOES NOT FIGURE PROMINENTLY IN BRAZIL'S CONCERNS, SILVEIRA, AND POSSIBLY GEISEL AND GOLBERY, WOULD EXPECT THE SECRETARY TO PROVIDE A BRIEF STATUS REPORT AND FORECAST ON THE NEGOTIATIONS. IT IS POSSIBLE ALSO THAT SILVEIRA WILL RAISE THE MATTER HIMSELF IN AN ESSENTIALLY PRO FORMA WAY BECAUSE HE MAY STILL HAVE SOME KIND OF COMMITMENT TO THE PANAMANIAN TO MAKE A PITCH TO THE SECRETARY.

D. THIRD-COUNTRY SITUATIONS AND PROBLEMS

WE BELIEVE THAT THERE IS A CLEAR MUTUAL INTEREST IN EXCHANGING OPINIONS AND ASSESSMENTS ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION AND THE OUTLOOK IN OTHER COUNTRIES OF THE CONTINENT AND IN UNDERSTANDING THE RESPECTIVE APPROACHES TO THOSE COUNTRIES AND PROBLEMS AMONG THEM. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO HAVE SILVEIRA'S UP-TO-DATE THINKING ON BRAZILIAN ATTITUDES TOWARD ARGENTINA; THE BUFFER STATES; PERU; CHILE; THE PERUVIAN-CHILEAN-BOLIVIAN PROBLEM OF THE CORRIDOR TO THE SEA; VENEZUELA AND ITS LEADERSHIP ASPIRATIONS; AND GROWING CUBAN INFLUENCE IN GUYANA. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT GOLBERY AND EVEN GEISEL MAY ALSO BE INTERESTED IN DISCUSSIONS OF SOME OF THE COUNTRIES AND SITUATIONS INDICATED ABOVE, BUT WE RECOMMEND THAT THE INITIATIVE BE LEFT TO THEM.

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6. BILATERAL QUESTIONS

A. TRADE:

THE NAME OF THE GAME FOR BRAZIL IS ACCESS TO THE US MARKET. OFFICIAL AND PUBLIC ATTENTION WILL BE INTENSELY FOCUSED ON THE GAMUT OF TRADE ISSUES BETWEEN US. EVERYONE OF THE SECRETARY'S INTERLOCUTORS WILL WANT TO DISCUSS THE CURRENT AND PROSPECTIVE RESTRICTIONS ON THE ENTRY OF BRAZILIAN EXPORTS INTO THE US, AND THERE IS NO FOBGING-OFF OF THE ISSUES TO THE ECONOMIC CONSULTATIVE GROUP OR ITS TRADE SUBGROUP. JUST BEFORE OR DURING THE SECRETARY'S VISIT THE ITC WILL HAVE ISSUED ITS FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE ESCAPE-CLAUSE ACTION ON SHOES. COUNTERVAILING DUTY ACTION AGAINST CASTOR OIL PRODUCTS LOOMS IN MARCH. ESCAPE-CLAUSE ACTION WITH REPECT TO HONEY--GOD SAVE THE MARK -- HAS JUST BEEN INITIATED. TEXTILE NEGOTIATIONS ARE SCHEDULED ALTHOUGH THE BRAZILIANS SO FAR ARE ONLY SUSPICIOUS, THERE MAY LIE DOWN THE ROAD THE MOST DESTRUCTIVE RETALIATORY ACTION OF ALL -- THE INVOCATION OF THE THIRD-COUNTRY PROVISIONS OF THE TRADE ACT AGAINST BRAZILIAN SOY OIL. WHEN TO THIS ARRAY IS ADDED EXISTING RESTRICTIONS ON SHOES AND HANDBAGS AND QUOTAS ON ALLOY STEEL AS A RESULT OF AN ITC DECISION, IT IS HARDLY SURPRISING THAT THE GOB AND INFORMED BRAZILIANS CONSIDER BRAZIL A SPECIAL TARGET OF PROTECTIONIST ATTACK; THAT THEY CLAIM THAT EVENTS ARE CONFIRMING THEIR FEARS THAT THE TRADE REFORM ACT WAS NOT A TRADE-LIBERALIZING INSTRUMENT BUT A HIGHLY RESTRICTIVE ONE, THAT THEY CONSIDER THE USG ADDRESS TO NORTH-SOUTH PROBLEMS TO BE HOLLOW RHETORIC OR AT BEST THE PALLID EXPRESSION OF GOOD INTENTIONS; AND THAT THEY LOOK UPON THE UNITED STATES, BENEFITTING FROM A HUGE FAVORABLE BILATERAL TRADE BALANCE, AS INDIFFERENT TO THE NEEDS OF BRAZIL AS IT FACES ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES. SOME OF THIS REACTION IS EMOTIONAL AND ONE-SIDED; SOME OF IT IS CALCULATED. BUT IT FORMS THE ATMOSPHERE THAT THE SECRETARY WILL ENCOUNTER-- AND IT CANNOT BE DISSIPATED BY THE APPLICATION OF COOL LOGIC OR CAREFUL EXPLANATION OR THE PLUGGING

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OF THE MTN'S AS THE ANSWER TO OUR BILATERAL PROBLEMS, ESSENTIAL AS THOSE RESPONSES ARE. AS PART OF THIS ATMOSPHERE, THERE WILL BE REFERENCES BY THE BRAZILIAN SIDE TO RETALIATION AGAINST US IMPORTS AND, PERHAPS, INVESTMENT AND TO THE INEVITABILITY OF DIVERSION OF BRAZILIAN SOURCES OF SUPPLY AWAY FROM THE UNITED

STATES. NO LONGER WILL THIS KIND OF COMMENT BE THE EXCLUSIVE PROVINCE OF SILVEIRA AND MINISTER OF INDUSTRY AND COMMERCE SEVERO GOMES; THE SECRETARY WILL HEAR IT FROM SIMONSEN WHOSE FIGHT WITH SILVEIRA IN BEHALF OF MODERATION HAS BEEN, FOR ALL PRACTICAL PURPOSES, LOST AS THE CONSEQUENCE OF THE SERIES OF US ACTIONS.

THE OBJECTIVE OF THE BRAZILIAN ASSAULT WILL BE TO GET THE SECRETARY TO HAVE A HALT PUT TO THE US RESTRICTIONS, TO EXERCISE "POLITICAL WILL" IN ORDER TO RESIST AND OVERCOME PROTECTIONIST FORCES IN THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND IN THE CONGRESS. THIS EFFORT IS OF A PIECE WITH SILVEIRA'S CAMPAIGN TO SEE THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM ESTABLISHED AS A MEANS OF "ELEVATING TO THE POLITICAL PLANE" THE ISSUES (READ: TRADE ISSUES) BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES. BUT, AS WE HAVE NOTED, SILVEIRA WILL NOT BE ALONE. GEISEL CERTAINLY WILL MAKE THIS THE BURDEN OF HIS TALK WITH THE SECRETARY; HE WILL PROBABLY REPEAT THE ALL TOO ACCURATE OBSERVATION HE MADE IN A MAJOR ADDRESS LAST YEAR THAT THIS KIND OF ISSUE IS ERODING THE REGARD THE BRAZILIAN PEOPLE HAVE ALWAYS HAD FOR THE UNITED STATES.

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3851

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 4 OF 6 BRASILIA 1202

LIMDIS

THE EMBASSY COMPLETELY UNDERSTANDS THAT THE SECRETARY HAS LIMITED MANEUVER ROOM ON TRADE QUESTIONS AND THAT SOME OF THE PROBLEMS BETWEEN

BRAZIL AND THE UNITED STATES ARE INTRACTABLE, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM. NEVERTHELESS, HE SHOULD COME ARMED BY WASHINGTON WITH AS MUCH POSITIVE FLEXIBILITY AS POSSIBLE. THERE ARE OF COURSE A NUMBER OF TEMPORIZING EXPEDIENTS THAT HE CAN RESORT TO: THE ITC DECISIONS ON STEEL AND SHOES ARE NOT THE FINAL WORD AND MUST BE REVIEWED BY THE PRESIDENT; THE DECISION ON CASTOR OIL PRODUCTS HAS NOT YET BEEN ANNOUNCED; IT IS PREMATURE TO JUDGE THE OUTCOME OF THE TEXTILE TALKS, ETC. (HE SHOULD NOT USE THE CURRENT ARGUMENT THAT THE NUMBER OF AFFIRMATIVE FINDINGS ON TRADE COMPLAINTS IS SMALL IN RELATION TO THE TOTAL NUMBER OF COMPLAINTS BECAUSE THIS IS JUST NOT SO IN THE CASE OF BRAZIL).

THESE LITERALLY ACCURATE BUT SUBSTANTIVELY EVASIVE EXPEDIENTS ARE PROBABLY BETTER USED IN PUBLIC STATEMENTS THAN IN PRIVATE MEETINGS, BUT IN BOTH PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SESSIONS WE EXPECT--AND WANT--THE SECRETARY TO EXPLAIN PATIENTLY THE UNPALATABLE REALITY: THE LEVEL OF UNEMPLOYMENT IN CERTAIN SECTORS IN THE US; ITS REFLECTIONS AND REPERCUSSIONS IN PUBLIC AND CONGRESSIONAL OPINION; THE SENSITIVITY OF US LABOR AND BUSINESS TO UNFAIR COMPETITION SUCH AS SUBSIDIES, OF WHICH THE BRAZILIAN

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EXPORT INCENTIVE SYSTEM IS A GLARING EXAMPLE; THE EXISTENCE OF LAWS BINDING ON THE EXECUTIVE. IN MEETINGS WITH BRAZILIAN OFFICIALS, THE SECRETARY PRESUMABLY WOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT WE TOO HAVE PROBLEMS WITH BRAZILIAN IMPORT CONTROL MEASURES.

ON A MORE UPBEAT NOTE, THE SECRETARY SHOULD NOTE THE EXPECTED RISE OF BRAZILIAN EXPORTS TO THE US AS OUR RECOVERY PROGRESSES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF A CAREFUL EXPLOITATION BY BRAZIL OF THE OPPORTUNITIES OFFERED BY GSP. IT WOULD ALSO BE APPROPRIATE TO MENTION TO GEISEL AND REIS VELLOSO THE USEFUL WORK THAT CAN BE DONE IN THE TRADE AREA BY THE NEWLY-ESTABLISHED US-BRAZIL JOINT BUSINESS COUNCIL, WHICH LINKS THE US PRIVATE SECTOR WITH THE BRAZILIAN LEADERS OF PRIVATE AND STATE ENTERPRISES. (IT WAS GEISEL WHO GAVE THE IDEA OF THE COUNCIL ITS START; REIS VELLOSO CARRIED IT TO FRUITION WITH THE US CHAMBER OF COMMERCE.)

COFFEE: THE SECRETARY MAY WISH ALSO TO CALL ATTENTION TO THE WORK OF THE US AND BRAZILIAN NEGOTIATORS IN HAMMERING OUT A DRAFT INTERNATIONAL COFFEE AGREEMENT AS AN EXAMPLE OF THE TWO COUNTRIES' ABILITY TO BARGAIN HARD BUT SUCCESSFULLY. IT WILL BE EVEN BETTER IF THE SECRETARY IS ABLE TO SAY THAT EXECUTIVE BRANCH EXAMINATION OF THE AGREEMENT IS COMPLETED AND THAT

IT WILL BE PRESENTED TO CONGRESS FOR APPROVAL WITH THE EXECUTIVE'S STRONG ENDORSEMENT. IF, HOWEVER, THERE IS A CHANCE OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH DISAPPROVAL, THE SECRETARY SHOULD, OF COURSE, NOT RAISE THE MATTER BUT RATHER SHOULD BE PREPARED TO TEMPORIZE IN RESPONSE TO BRAZILIAN QUESTIONS. (SILVEIRA AND SEVERO GOMES ARE THE DIRECTLY CONCERNED MINISTERS; SIMONSEN AND PAULINELLI HAVE A SECONDARY INTEREST.)

THE SECRETARY SHOULD BE PREPARED TO EMPLOY THIS ARRAY OF EXPLANATIONS (AND OTHERS SUPPLIED BY WASHINGTON) IN MEETING THE TRADE ISSUES HEAD-ON. THE EMBASSY ALSO HOPES, AS STATED EARLIER, THAT HE WILL COME ARMED CWITH MAXIMUM POSITIVE FLEXIBILITY. RECOGNIZING, HOWEVER, THE BASIC DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE TWO COUNTRIES, THE EMBASSY SEES SERIOUS OBSTACLES TO THE ACHIEVEMENT OF ANY APPRECIABLE IMPROVEMENT IN

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THIS ABSOLUTELY CRUCIAL AREA OF THE RELATIONSHIP AS A RESULT OF THE SECRETARY'S VISIT.

B. REVISED NUCLEAR AGREEMENT:

THE EMBASSY STRONGLY HOPES THAT CONSIDERATION OF THE DRAFT CIRCULAR 175 MEMORANDUM ON REVISIONS OF THE US-BRAZILIAN NUCLEAR AGREEMENT WILL BE FAR ENOUGH ADVANCED BY THE TIME OF THE SECRETARY'S VISIT FOR HIM TO INFORM THE BRAZILIAN SIDE (UEKI, SILVEIRA, GEISEL AND GOLBERY ARE THE CONCERNED OFFICIALS) OF OUR READINESS TO INITIATE EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS ON PRINCIPLES, IF THE GOB SO DESIRES (BRASILIA 1101). IF THE SITUATION IN WASHINGTON PERMITS, THE SECRETARY MAY WISH TO DISCUSS PRINCIPLES HIMSELF. IN EITHER CASE, THE EMBASSY REQUESTS NOTIFICATION FROM THE DEPARTMENT SO THAT WE MAY ALERT THE BRAZILIAN SIDE, IT BEING UNDERSTOOD THAT, IF NOTIFICATION OF THE SECRETARY'S READINESS TO ADDRESS THE PRINCIPLES OF A REVISED ACCORD IS SHORT, THE BRAZILIANS MAY WELL BE UNPREPARED AND THEREFORE UNABLE TO TALK.

EVEN SHOULD THE SECRETARY NOT TAKE ANY INITIATIVE, IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE GOB ITSELF MAY INQUIRE ABOUT THE STATUS OF OUR CONSIDERATION OF THE AGREEMENT, IN WHICH CASE THE SECRETARY, WE ASSUME, WOULD GIVE THE APPROPRIATE REPLY: WE ARE WORKING HARD.

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LIMDIS

C. COOPERATION ON ENERGY RESEARCH: THE SECRETARY'S VISIT AFFORDS AN EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITY TO GET SOMETHING STARTED WITH BRAZIL ON A JOINT ENERGY RESEARCH PROGRAM. EVEN IF AN INITIATIVE BY THE SECRETARY WERE LIMITED TO AN EXPRESSION OF OUR INTEREST IN SETTING UP A JOINT STUDY GROUP -- WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE NEW CONSULTATIVE SYSTEM -- HE WOULD BE ACKNOWLEDGING A MUTUAL INTEREST IN A CRITICAL FIELD AND WOULD BE GIVING CONTENT TO THE VARIOUS USG DECLARATIONS OF OUR READINESS TO WORK WITH OTHER COUNTRIES IN THIS AREA. THE BRAZILIANS, WHO ARE KEENLY AWARE OF THEIR ENERGY VULNERABILITIES, HAVE SOMETHING TO OFFER US, PARTICULARLY IN BITUMINOUS SHALE DEVELOPMENT; THEY ARE INTERESTED IN MUCH THE SAME RANGE OF ENERGY RESEARCH AS WE. IN SHORT, THIS WOULD NOT BE A ONE-WAY STREET.

IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE FOR THE SECRETARY TO BE ABLE TO SAY THAT ERDA, WHICH CONDUCTS OUR RESEARCH PROGRAM IN ENERGY AND WHICH WOULD BE THE USG ENTITY INVOLVED WITH BRAZIL, IS THE US OPERATING AGENCY PARTICIPATING IN THE IEA'S BROAD EFFORT AND THAT THERE COULD BE AN INDIRECT BRAZILIAN LINK WITH IEA A LINK THAT MIGHT, DEPENDING ON DEVELOPMENTS AND BRAZIL'S DESIRES, BECOME MORE SUBSTANTIAL. THE THOUGHT BEHIND THIS PROPOSED ALLUSION TO IEA WOULD BE, OF COURSE, TO INDICATE THE PROSPECTS OF AN EVOLUTIONARY ASSOCIATION

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OF BRAZIL WITH AN ORGAN OF THE DEVELOPED WORLD. (BEYOND IEA, WHO KNOWS, OECD?)

WE SUSPECT THAT SILVEIRA WOULD BE SUSPICIOUS OF A REFERENCE TO IEA, BUT WE ARE REASONABLY CERTAIN THAT UEKI, WHO IS THE OTHER MINISTER CONCERNED AND WHO APPEARS TO BE A FIRST-WORLDER AT HEART, WOULD BE VERY INTERESTED. GIVEN UEKI'S PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR ENERGY MATTERS AND VIEW THE IMMEDIATE PURELY TECHNICAL NATURE OF THE INITIATIVE, IT WOULD BE ENTIRELY CORRECT TO RAISE THE MATTER FIRST WITH UEKI AND THEN PLAY IT BACK TO SILVEIRA. THE EMBASSY WOULD WAIVE IN THIS CASE THE "PRIOR NOTIFICATION" RULE.

TO SUM UP, THE EMBASSY CONSIDERS A PROPOSAL FOR THE INITIATION OF A STUDY OF A JOINT ENERGY RESEARCH PROGRAM TO BE WORTHWHILE IN ITSELF. THE ADDITIONAL DIMENSION OF A POSSIBLE LINK TO IEA WOULD BE VERY INTERESTING POLITICALLY.

SHOULD THERE BE AGREEMENT IN WASHINGTON TO THIS SUGGESTION FOR COOPERATION IN ENERGY RESEARCH AND SHOULD THE GOB ACCEPT IT, THAT DECISION SHOULD BE INCORPORATED IN ENERGY RESEARCH AND SHOULD THE GOB ACCEPT IT, THAT DECISION SHOULD BE INCORPORATED IN THE COMMUNIQUE.

D. EXPANSION OF THE SCIENCE-BILATERAL: THE EMBASSY HAS REPORTED (BRASILIA 1160) INTEREST IN THE OFFICIAL BRAZILIAN SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY IN DETERMINING WHETHER THE USG IS PREPARED TO EXPAND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE EXISTING BILATERAL AGREEMENT AND THROUGH OTHER USG MODALITIES. UP TO NOW, THE JOINT EFFORTS UNDERTAKEN UNDER THE AGREEMENT HAVE BEEN TRULY MODEST AND THE NSF, THE US EXECUTIVE AGENT, HAS BEEN RELUCTANT TO ENLARGE THE COOPERATION IN ANY SIGNIFICANT WAY. THE EMBASSY, WHICH HAS LONG CONSIDERED THE SCIENCE BILATERAL AS A POTENTIALLY SIGNIFICANT VEHICLE FOR "POST-AID LINKAGES," HAS STRONGLY URGED A POSITIVE AND IMAGINATIVE RESPONSE TO THE BRAZILIAN INTEREST IN KNOWING WHAT THE PROSPECTS FOR INCREASED JOINT ACTIVITY REALLY ARE.

THE EMBASSY DOES NOT KNOW WHETHER THE WASHINGTON AGENCIES CAN COME TO A DECISION ON THE BRAZILIAN

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INQUIRY IN TIME FOR THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. SUCH A TIMELY DECISION WOULD OBVIOUSLY BE HIGHLY DESIREABLE BECAUSE IT WOULD PERMIT THE SECRETARY TO TAKE AN INITIATIVE IN EXPRESSING TO REIS VELLOSO, THE IMMEDIATELY RESPONSIBLE MINISTER, AND TO SILVEIRA HIS PERSONAL SATISFACTION AT THE PROSPECT OF A MORE VIGOROUS AND FULLER EXCHANGE IN THIS MOST IMPORTANT AREA.

WHETHER OR NOT THIS MATTER ENTERS THE COMMUNIQUE

WOULD LARGELY DEPEND ON THE AMOUNT OF FORWARD MOTION --
IF ANY -- THAT MIGHT HAVE BEEN DEVELOPED IN WASHING-
TON BY THE TIME THE SECRETARY ARRIVES IN BRASILIA.

E. AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION AGREEMENT: AS THE
EMBASSY HAS REPORTED, BRAZILIAN AIR MINISTER ARARIPE
(WHOM THE SECRETARY WILL MEET AT THE ITAMARATY DINNER AND
THE RETURN RECEPTION AT THE RESIDENCE) AND SILVEIRA (AT
ARARIPE'S INSTIGATION) HAVE TAKEN A VERY KEEN INTEREST IN
THE CONCLUSION OF A BILATERAL AIRWORTHINESS CERTIFICATION
AGREEMENT. THE PROPOSED AGREEMENT HAS PRESTIGE, TECHNOLOGICAL
AND COMMERCIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR BRAZIL THAT MAKE ITS IMPORTANCE
HERE HIGHLY DISPROPORTIONATE TO THE COSTS TO THE U.S. THE
EMBASSY IS VERY MUCH IN FAVOR OF ITS RAPID CONCLUSION.
AS A FINAL STEP IN THE PRELIMINARIS PRIOR TO A FIRM U.S.
DECISION TO NEGOTIATE AND SIGN THE AGREEMENT, AN FAA
TECHNICAL TEAM IS JUST FINISHING AN EXAMINATION OF THE
ORGANIZATIONAL AND INSTITUTIONAL MEASURES TAKEN BY THE
APPROPRIATE BRAZILIAN GOVERNMENT ENTITY TO ESTABLISH ITS
QUALIFICATIONS AS A SUITABLE PARTNER OF THE J.S. THE
EMBASSY UNDERSTANDS THAT THE FAA GROUPD HAS FOUND ALL IN ORDER.

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ACTION ARA-06

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 6 OF 6 BRASILIA 1202

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ALTHOUGH A U.S. GOVERNMENT DECISION TO NEGOTIATE WOULD
BE HIGHLY USEFUL IF IT COULD BE OBTAINED BEFORE THE
SECRETARY COMES HERE, THE EMBASSY RECONGNIZES THAT THIS IS
PROBABLY NOT POSSIBLE. THE EMBASSY WOULD WANT, HOWEVER, TO
HAVE THE SECRETARY INDICATE TO ARARIPE, FIRST, AND THEN
TO SILVEIRA HIS AWARENESS OF THE BRAZILIAN INTEREST AND

HIS PLEASURE IN LEARNING THAT THE FINAL FAA EVALUATION WAS HIGHLY POSITIVE. THE DIVIDENDS WITH THE AIR FORCE AND ARARIPE PERSONALLY WOULD BE SUBSTANTIAL.

F. RECONVENING OF THE JOINT ECONOMIC CONSULTATIVE GROUP: THE EMBASSY HAS ALWAYS ASSUMED THAT THE JOINT ECONOMIC CONSULTATIVE GROUP (AND ITS TRADE SUB-GROUP) WOULD BE FOLDED INTO THE BILATERAL CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM TO BE CREATED BY THE MOU. IF THAT ASSUMPTION IS SHARED IN WASHINGTON, WE WOULD RECOMMEND THAT THE SECRETARY AND SILVEIRA AGREE TO THE RECONVENING OF THE JECG UNDER ITS NEW AEGIS FOR A DATE TO BE SET BY COMMON AGREEMENT (OR WITHIN A SPECIFIED TIME FRAME). SUCH A DECISION, TO BE ANNOUNCED IN THE COMMUNIQUE, WOULD DEMONSTRATE THAT THE NEW UMBRELLA CONSULTATIVE MECHANISM WAS FUNCTIONING AT A LEVEL BELOW THE PRINCIPALS AND BETWEEN THEIR MEETINGS. THE EMBASSY WOULD BE GLAD TO SUBMIT A PROPOSED AGENDA FOR THE SESSION. IN MAKING THIS SUGGESTION THE EMBASSY IS AWARE OF WASHINGTON'S IDEA OF A MEETING OF THE TRADE SUB-GROUP IN MARCH. IT PREFERS THE SENIOR GROUP AS A MORE SUITABLE
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FOLLOW-ON TO THE SECRETARY'S VISIT. THE SUB-GROUP ON TRADE COULD HOLD SEPARATE MEETINGS DURING THIS NEXT SESSION OF THE JECG TO FURNISH THE OPPORTUNITY FOR A FULL EXCHANGE ON THE MORE TECHNICAL ASPECTS OF TRADE QUESTION. IF THE DEPARTMENT CONCURS WITH THIS SUGGESTION, PLEASE LET US KNOW SO THAT WE CAN ALERT THE BRAZILIAN SIDE TO THE FACT THAT THE SECRETARY WILL MAKE THE PROPOSAL.

G. HUMAN RIGHTS: ASSUMING THAT THE SECRETARY WILL REFER TO THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN BRAZIL, THE EMBASSY CONSIDERS THAT THE MOST APPROPRIATE INTERLOCUTOR WOULD BE GOLBERY. WE SUGGEST THAT THE SUBJECT BE INTRODUCED IN THE CONTEXT OF A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF INTERNAL POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS. SUCH A DISCUSSION COULD BE INITIATED BY A REFERENCE BY THE SECRETARY TO HIS AWARENESS OF GOLBERY'S KEEN INTEREST IN AND KNOWLEDGE OF THE U.S. POLITICAL SYSTEM AND HIS RESPONSIBILITIES AS CHIEF OF THE CIVIL HOUSEHOLD IN THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL FIELD. THE FACT THAT THE TWO COUNTRIES ARE HAVING ELECTIONS IN NOVEMBER 1976 (THE BRAZILIAN BEING COUNTRY-WIDE MUNICIPAL ELECTIONS ON NOVEMBER 15) MIGHT ALSO BE A USEFUL GAMBIT FOR THE SECRETARY. AS PART OF HIS ADDRESS TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION THE SECRETARY SHOULD STATE THAT HE IS AWARE OF PRESIDENT GEISEL'S DESIRE TO SEE THAT ABUSES CEASE, THAT HE UNDERSTANDS THERE HAVE BEEN DIFFICULTIES IN GETTING FULL CONTROL OF SOME OF THE ELEMENTS INVOLVED, BUT THAT HE GATHERS THAT THE SITUATION HAS IMPROVED AS THE RESULT OF FORCEFUL ACTION BY THE PRESIDENT

(THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE SECOND ARMY DOES NOT HAVE TO BE CITED SPECIFICALLY). GOLBERY WILL PROBABLY RESPOND AFFIRMATIVELY TO THE OBSERVATIONS. THE SECRETARY MAY WANT TO EXPRESS SATISFACTION IN LIGHT OF THE CONCERNS IN U.S. PUBLIC, RELIGIOUS, INTELLECTUAL AND GOVERNMENTAL CIRCLES.

H. EMBASSY HOPES THAT WHILE THE SECRETARY IS HERE THE DATES OF A GEISLE VISIT TO U.S. WILL BE PINNED DOWN. IF THEY ARE, THERE SHOULD BE PROMINENT MENTION OF THE VISIT IN THE COMMUNIQUE.

II. QUESTIONS ON WHICH WASHINGTON DECISIONS ARE REQUIRED:
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1. WE SHOULD NOTIFY GOB IF SECRETARY PLANS TO RAISE SEABEDS ISSUE.

2. DECISIONS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE ON PENDING PROPOSALS FOR EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS ON PRICIPLES FOR REVISING OUR NUCLEAR AGREEMENT, AND GOB WIL HAVE TO BE NOTIFIED IF WE PLAN TO RAISE THE MATTER.

3. DECISIONS WILL HAVE TO BE MADE ON AFOREMENTIONED PROPOSALS FOR COOPERATIN IN ENERGY RESEARCH.

4. WE WILL HAVE TO DETERMINE OUR RESPONSE TO BRAZILIAN PROPOSALS FOR EXPANSION OF SCIENCE BILATERAL. WE SHOULD INFORM FOREIGN MINISTRY IN ADVANCE IF THIS IS TO BE RAISED.

5. DECISION SHOULD BE MADE ON RECONVENING IN MARCH OF JOINT ECONOMIC CONSULTATIVE GROUP AND PERHAPS TRADE SUB-GROUP, WITH ADVANCE NOTIFICATION TO ITAMARATY.

6. DECISION SHOULD BE MADE ON PROPOSED DATES FOR VISIT TO US BY PRESIDENT GEISEL.
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